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CHAPTER 7
THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF  
INNOVATION AND DISRUPTIVE CHANGE:  
THE INTERRELATEDNESS OF TECHNOLOGY, 
LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Mie Augier, PhD; and Jerry Guo, MS*
INTRODUCTION
“No degree of technological development of scientific calculation will 
overcome the human dimension in war”1
Technology is a buzzword, central to innovation, in particular in relation 
to disruptive innovation. However, there are several aspects of technol-
ogy and disruptive innovation that deserve clarification. From critiques of 
Christensen2 to writings about Silicon Valley unicorns, several contributors 
have noticed pitfalls in the disruption literature, including some miscon-
ceptions about the role of leaders and leadership. For example, it has been 
noticed that there is too much focus on success; on technology and on indi-
vidual disruptors and their personality, and not enough on other important 
factors such as management of the research and development processes, and 
the curiosity underlying innovations; forgotten failures; the organizational 
capabilities and capacity to change; and the role of organizational capabilities 
and routines in facilitating this process. Christensen has responded3 to some 
of these criticisms and sought to bring the disruption literature back to its 
roots and to clarify disruption theory. In this chapter, we aim to contribute 
to “bringing back in” the organizational and management dimension to the 
discussions of technological innovations and disruptive change, focusing on 
examples from military organizations. 
Disruptive innovation research developed mostly in the context of business 
organizations (although, for decades before, military revolutions and disrup-
tions have been studied), where new firms captured market share and out-
competed incumbent firms by targeting niche market segments with lower 
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the United States Navy or Department of Defense.
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cost products or services.4 In both business and military contexts, the imple-
mentation of disruption and capturing its value involves much more than 
the technology or the disruptive innovation itself. The focus of this chapter 
is thus the organizational and management aspects of disruptive processes, 
along with the role of capabilities, routines, and strategic leadership imple-
menting disruptive innovation. Although aspects of the technology are im-
portant, the human dimension of leaders and managers also play key roles 
in identifying the technologies and in translating them into new strategic 
opportunities. 
In addition, organizational structures, routines and capabilities are needed to 
support both the emergence and implementation of innovative technologies. 
This is not just about aligning incentives but is in large part about building a 
culture of organizational identification, loyalty and trust, which supports the 
nurturing of experimentation with new ideas and their implementation. A 
key to the successful strategic management of disruptive innovation lies in 
recognizing the embeddedness and interrelations of the long-term drivers 
of change. 
Innovations and sustainable changes in organizations often take decades to 
evolve. While it is easy to focus on technologies or individual leaders, the 
management of the innovation in ways useful to capture value from them re-
lies on understanding the embeddedness of change in people, organization, 
technology, routines and capabilities.
We also discuss aspects of a case of an organizational disruption, innova-
tion, organizational implementation, and how leaders managed it by exam-
ining the emergence and transformation of the United States Marine Corps 
around “manoeuver warfare,” which emerged as the central philosophy and 
doctrine for the Marine Corps in the 1980s and 1990s and guided a com-
prehensive transformation of the organization.5 Although there were intel-
lectual and even institutional roots of this transformation earlier, only in the 
1980s and 1990s did it become embedded in how the organization thought 
and fought. In other words, successful implementation depended crucially 
on leadership and the strategic and organizational management of the capa-
bilities and processes underlying the innovations (including the resistances 
to changing and adoption), not just the technologies or the disruptions 
themselves. This case also illustrates the often long and evolutionary nature 
leading to disruptions and their implementation. We believe that under-
standing this and other innovations in military organizations may be useful 
to improving our understanding of the management of disruptive changes 
in organizations in general. 
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In this the remainder of this chapter, we will discuss aspects of disruption 
and innovation, elaborate on an example, then conclude with some lessons 
and possible steps towards a more integrative and evolutionary framework 
for understanding the organizational and managerial process underlying 
the (strategic) management and leadership of disruptive changes (includ-
ing innovation).
THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC  
MANAGEMENT OF DISRUPTIVE INNOVATIONS
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION
Disruptive innovation is a concept in the management literature made 
popular by Clayton Christensen in a series of studies in the late 1990s.6 
Disruptive innovation occurs when a small firm (relative to incumbents) 
introduces a product or service to a niche market overlooked by incum-
bents. As disruptors gain a share of niche categories, they then move into 
the mainstream market segment and succeed because incumbents have 
not responded. Disruptors typically introduce new products or services at 
lower cost to customers. 
Much has been written about disruption innovation and technology in the 
management literature. Often, this literature has focused on success driven 
by individual entrepreneurs. An additional area of focus concerns techno-
logical change driven by one particular firm. The emphasis is thus less on the 
management or the implementation of the disruption.
Disruption does not always mean success. A disruption innovation is simply 
one where the disrupting firm captures a share of an underserved market and 
then starts capturing segments of the mainstream market after competitors 
do not respond. Therefore, the innovation disrupts the original structure of 
the market or industry. This does not suggest that the focal disrupting firm 
always maintains a hold on the technology or that competitors will not re-
spond in the future. Kodak was one of the originators of digital photography 
technology but failed to respond to its own disruptive innovation. Kodak’s 
failure to capitalize on this technology and prevent competitors from utiliz-
ing it led to losing market share as digital camera technology matured.7
The Kodak example illustrates how it may be worthwhile to focus less on 
the technology and inventors per se, and more on how the process of dis-
ruption is inherently organizational in nature. Disruption, like most stra-
tegic changes, takes place in organizations and involves a complex mix of 
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individuals, ideas, organizations, routines, inertias, technologies and capa-
bilities. The same is true for military organizations. By thinking about a be-
havioural- or capabilities-based lens of disruptive innovation, we may help 
understand when disruptive technologies will affect military organizations 
and when they will not. 
Of course, military organizations compete on a significantly different level 
from business or non-profit organizations. Rather than trying to capture 
market share, military organizations seek to advance their nation’s strategic 
goals and to prevent the enemy from accomplishing its goals. Technologi-
cal advances in militaries also occur differently from private sector organi-
zations. For example, many military technologies are expressly developed 
through government research and development laboratories for use only 
by the military. Procurement of such technology is subject to control from 
stakeholders both within and outside the organization; the military itself may 
propose a technology be adopted, but the ultimate adoption of the technol-
ogy is contingent on government authorities funding the request. 
DISRUPTION IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
Despite a reputation for their resistance to change, military organizations 
have undergone some of the most disruptive transformations. Therefore, 
they may be useful illustrations of some of the management aspects of dis-
ruptive processes. Unlike startups, the stakes for failure are very high. If a 
disruptive innovation fails, the wrong people often die. Thus, military organi-
zations must identify mechanisms for allowing disruption without compro-
mising the organization’s core competencies and to allow mission fulfillment. 
They must use innovations to create strategic asymmetries that can be used 
to achieve strategic and operational advantages. They must find ways to con-
structively manage disruptive processes and the implementation of changes 
in the organization. 
Notable examples of military-related innovations, with different degrees of 
disruptiveness, include:
t Cavalry warfare
t Emergence of critical resources and capabilities (e.g., gunpowder)
t Weapons and systems upgrades
t Digital naval steering systems
t Carrier warfare
t Tanks and armoured warfare
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t Precision guided munitions
These, and other, innovations are often built on civilian developments. They 
have had and continue to have tremendous influence on the way military or-
ganizations perform, and their evolution has been shaped not only by the im-
plicit or explicit underlying technologies, but also by the extent to which the 
organizational structures and capabilities were managed to adopt them. Such 
innovations are almost always the products of the novel interaction of one 
or more evolutionary changes in the underlying configuration of resources, 
technologies, organizations and capabilities. The management of these con-
figurations is critical to the successful adoption and implementation of dis-
ruptive innovations. 
Moreover, such innovations have also often been influenced by events in the 
larger strategic environment, as well as by the interactions between organi-
zational factors and dominant ways of thinking. For example, despite the 
British combined use of tanks and infantry to break German lines in 1918 
(i.e., an early armoured capability paradigm), most of the thinking around 
victories at the time was firmly embedded in infantry use of artillery warfare. 
Despite the advances in technology, the organization was still in its old para-
digm.8 Another example is the use of helicopters in combat-combining tech-
nologies in new ways, this was pioneered by the United States Army. But, due 
to several organizational, political and managerial factors, such as the lack 
of careers in the Army’s organization for helicopter pilots, the United States 
Marine Corps were the first to be able to adopt its organization and capabili-
ties to fully utilize the recombinant innovation of vertical lift.
Innovation, thus, involves a mix of strategic, political and organizational fac-
tors. Individuals and ideas are particularly important in the early periods of 
major shifts when new ideas are vulnerable to the many kinds of resistance 
to newness and to change. 
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CONCEPTUALIZING DISRUPTIVE CHANGES
The concept of a disruptive innovation is similar in some ways to the con-
cept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a concept well established 
in defense thinking. An RMA occurs when new technologies and new op-
erational concepts combine to fundamentally alter the conduct of military 
operations.9 However, the RMA is characterized not by a single technology, 
but by a bundle of technologies. The RMA study suggests that the combina-
tion of machine gun, airplane, submarine, and battleship dramatically altered 
warfare toward the end of the 19th century; the change was not due to one 
of these technologies alone, but all of them in concert with new operation-
al concepts. Central to the RMA concept was not just the technology, but 
changes in thinking.10
There are different degrees of disruptiveness in innovation and change man-
agement processes. Typologies of innovation often focus on technology. 
However, the process is more complex and technological categories often 
overlap.  One way of looking at innovations is in terms of broader categories 
organized on organizational effects. A useful framework was introduced by 
Henderson and Clark11 and focused on existing core concepts, as well as the 
linkages between those and the organizational components (see Figure 7.1).
Core Concepts / Ways  
of Thinking:  Reinforced
Core Concepts:  
Changed / Overturned
Linkages Between  
Concepts and  
Organizational  
Components:  Unchanged
Incremental Innovation Modular Innovation
Linkages Between  





Figure 7.1 Henderson and Clark’s Framework for Understanding Innovation
In military organizations, examples of incremental innovations can include 
weapons upgrades; such “innovations in the little” over time can in fact 
have very powerful effects. A weapons upgrade can affect many personnel 
across the organization but reflect a relatively small investment on the part 
of the organization. For example, the change from a muzzle-loading rifle to 
a bolt-action rifle had significant implications for the conduct of warfare. 
Soldiers were no longer forced to spend long periods of time reloading in 
between shots; they could rifle many shots in succession. This represented an 
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incremental development of the core technology of the rifle, but represented 
a large innovative shift. 
Architectural innovations or disruptions include the emergence of the ad-
vance base concept, Marine Air-Ground Task Force warfare, and carrier 
aviation. Disruptive innovations are rare and often not seen as disruptive at 
first, otherwise organizational forces would have suppressed them. The ma-
noeuver warfare movement was, on the organizational level, a radical change 
in how the organization thought, but it included and institutionalized also 
incremental, modular and architectural innovations. We will soon elaborate 
on manoeuver warfare in a case study. 
For each innovation, the disruptive element of the innovation, incremental 
or radical, must be managed. Therefore, the real keys are the human and or-
ganizational capabilities, and the ability of the leaders in place to appreciate 
experiments. This involves being questioned, not taking credit, and genu-
inely putting the organization’s long-term survival above personal goals. The 
United States Marine Corps refers to this as “we” leadership and this can be 
built into capabilities.12 
In the case study below, one can also see the influence of many different fac-
tors and their interaction over the evolution and “unfolding” of the process 
of disruption and its implementation. 
LEADERSHIP OF DISRUPTION AND  
INNOVATIONS IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS:  
THE CASE OF MANOEUVER WARFARE
“There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of 
success, nor more difficult to handle, than to initiate a new order of 
things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old 
order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would by a new 
order...[due to] the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe 
in anything new until they have had actual experience of it”
 – Machiavelli, “The Prince”13
Resistance to change, as illustrated in Henry Ford’s famous saying that if he 
had asked people what they wanted when he was developing the automobile 
they would have said “faster horses,” permeates both business and military 
organizations. Making sure change is adopted by the organization and in-
corporated into its routines and “ways of thinking” is often at least as (if not 
much more) complex than thinking up the innovation or disruption itself. 
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THE MARINE CORPS
The Marine Corps has a rich history of competing in different environments 
(including peacetime) since its birth in 1775.14 The issue of “What makes a 
Marine a Marine” has been the source of puzzlement for decades. Marines 
exhibit a strong sense of organizational identification and unity–despite a 
seemingly strong hierarchy–as manifested in General Alfred Gray’s state-
ment, “Every Marine is, first and foremost, a rifleman.”15 Indeed, a lesson 
from Gray is  to always put your organization and your people ahead of your-
self, which represents a contrast to much of management theory’s empha-
sis on self-interested behaviour. But it is also an essential element in under-
standing how and why the organization seems better able to change than one 
might perhaps expect.
The uniqueness of the Marine Corps from an organizational and capabili-
ties perspective also includes the fact that the Marine Corps is, effectively, 
ambidextrous by nature, as it mixes and integrates the “core competencies” 
of other services. While the US Army is known for land combat, the US Air 
Force for its flying, the US Navy for its sea capabilities, the Marine Corps has 
a comprehensive land-sea-air component, so it has a built-in need for flexible 
capabilities, as well as for a mindset that is both able to learn from the past as 
well as try to shape the future. 
The simultaneous embrace and pursuit of exploration and exploitation in 
the Marine Corps is made possible in part by its leadership style. Far from 
micro-management, a key to how Marines operate is the shared understand-
ing of the commander’s intent. We argue this is made possible at least in part 
by organizational loyalty and identification facilitated by management pro-
cesses. When in combat, the ability to adapt and to be innovative at the front 
line comes from the ability of junior leaders to make rapid decisions based 
on their understanding of their leader’s intent. The shared understanding of 
the organization’s goals minimizes interest biases through training and the 
building of loyalty. It is also made possible through organizational communi-
cation; not formal communication channels but largely informal and implicit 
ones. These are analogous to shared mental and cognitive models. 
“We believe that implicit communication – to communicate through 
mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood 
phrases or even anticipating each other’s thoughts – is a faster, more 
effective way to communicate than using detailed, explicit instruc-
tions. We develop this ability through familiarity and trust, which are 
based on a shared philosophy and shared experience.”16 
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Like all military organizations, the Marine Corps has had to adapt to the 
changing strategic environment over the last two centuries. One of the most 
recent comprehensive transformations of the Marine Corps into a more 
adaptive organization occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s, and was led by 
Marine Corps General Alfred Gray. Gray knew that to improve the Marine 
Corps, one had to change how the organization thought in the long run, not 
just its equipment and technologies in the short run. The transformation 
needed to be intellectual as well as organizational, and it needed to start with 
a hard-diagnostic look at how to think, not what to think. 
Gray and his colleagues outlined a framework for Warfighting, which evolved 
as a symbol of adaptive and strategic thinking. This key text which is read 
by Marines at all levels was first described as a “doctrine” but it was much 
more than this; it is a philosophy and a strategic way of thinking instilled 
in all Marines regardless of rank and age, and is to be applied in peace-
time as well as in wartime. In Gray’s words, it is a “philosophy for action 
that, in war, in crisis and in peace, dictates the Marine Corps approach to 
duty.”17 The overall warfighting framework also became a foundation for the 
Marine Corps central initiatives such as manoeuver warfare and decentral-
ized leadership.18 Central ingredients in the philosophy were the importance 
of understanding competitor weaknesses (e.g., a strategic asymmetry) and 
the use of speed and agility and decentralized decision making. In effect, ma-
noeuver warfare emerged almost as a behavioural and evolutionary alterna-
tive to previous static approaches. 
How did such an organizational transformation take place, and what was 
the role of leadership and organizational factors in the management of the 
“disruptive” process? Any institutional and organizational change involves 
people, ideas, and bureaucracies. Perhaps the reason the Marines could 
transform is because they had always recognized the importance of people 
first: “For the Marine Corps the first priority has always been its people, not 
its functions or its technology.”19 
AL GRAY
Al Gray was the son of a New Jersey railroad engineer. In 1950, he enlisted in 
the Marine Corps as a private, winning a commission as an officer two years 
later. He held a Bachelor of Science degree from the State University of New 
York but was largely self-educated. Gray initially served as an artillery of-
ficer, later moving into communications. He served two years in the Korean 
War and five years in Vietnam. During the fall of Saigon, Gray commanded 
the well-executed operation to evacuate Americans and Vietnamese from the 
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city. The rest of his resume was heavy with assignments in Camp Lejeune, 
Okinawa, and Quantico, rather than at the Pentagon. By the time he was 
nominated by President Reagan to be the 29th Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, he had more field time than almost any general officer of any service. 
As a leader, Gray cared about ideas, not rank or prestige; senior officers 
took off their ranks during de-briefings and exercises. He did not want any 
pomp when he visited troops, and he did not sit at head tables at dinner, but 
with the young lieutenants (i.e., living the “officers eat last” philosophy).  He 
downplayed his own contributions, saying that one can get more done if one 
does not try to take credit for it. He emphasized upgrading the soul of the 
Corps, not cosmetics: 
“He wanted officers who worried more about clever tactics than pres-
tige staff assignments, who had no interest beyond finding better ways 
to smite the nation’s enemies…He wanted Marines to fight better by 
fighting smarter, by exploiting intelligence and targeting technology, 
not relying on massive firepower... He wanted the Corps to turn in-
ward in a crusade of self-improvement, and to let the image problems 
take care of themselves.”20
Gray led the Marine Corps in a time of decreasing budgets, but strongly be-
lieved in upgrading educational capabilities and the quality of Marines. Prior 
to Gray, commandants felt the Marine Corps had lost its elitism and needed 
to get it back. Commandant Wilson made personnel reform a priority.
“By 1989 [the Marine Corps] had reversed a recruiting pattern that 
had jeopardized its claims to elitism. In 1975, the Marine Corps had 
become a dumping ground for the refuse of military recruiting; fifteen 
years later it celebrated the quality of the men and women it admitted 
and allowed to continue its service. The Marine Corps improved its 
personnel in the face of adverse demographics and its own unique 
requirements. Its success in finding a “few good men,” which are nei-
ther few nor all men, laid the basis for its ability to modernize and 
reorganize for global contingency missions that required unusual so-
phistication in military skills and motivation.”21 
Demographically, Gray sought to increase the proportion of high school 
graduates to over 75% and to shrink the proportion of enlistees in the lowest 
cognitive ability group. Moreover, he allowed “problem Marines” to separate. 
Over a few years, these changes led to improvements in basic training and 
quality of life in the barracks. 
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Gray was known for caring for his men and sticking his head out for them. 
After the 1983 suicide bombing of the Marine Corps headquarters build-
ing in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 241 Americans, Gray was one of a few 
general officers to offer his resignation. One officer remarked that he offered 
to resign because, “Somehow there must be accountability, there must be re-
sponsibility.”22 It was an offer that his superior refused.
Gray’s years in cryptology were the place where he saw some significant 
successes in reorganizing activities to increase effectiveness. Dating back to 
World War II (WWII), there were two schools of thought about how signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) information should be used. Most Navy officers and 
Marine cryptologists of the day thought SIGINT should be separated from 
other intel sources in order not to contaminate it. Gray subscribed to the 
opposite view that all-source intelligence was the right approach. In 1967, 
he proved the approach by undertaking an intense, retrospective analysis 
to align intercepted Vietnamese enemy communications with enemy op-
erations. “It was extremely tedious, detailed, time-consuming work, but 
sure enough…the integration of SIGINT and general intelligence resulted 
in cracking the code.”23 Thus, Gray was awarded the annual Travis Trophy by 
the National Security Agency (NSA), which goes to a subordinate command 
that most contributed to the NSA mission during the year. Though the work 
involved many, Gray was selected to personally receive the award because he 
had spearheaded the professionalization of the Marine Corps’ SIGINT capa-
bility through many trying years, from behind the scenes. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WARFIGHTING
Gray was successful in implementing manoeuver warfare in part due to build-
ing a team of smart people. He focused not on finding those who agreed with 
him, but those who could help the program evolve and develop in ways useful 
to the organization. One such collaborator, General Paul van Riper said, 
“Despite my protest–as far as a serving officer can protest orders–
General Gray denied an extension of my tour in Okinawa, and in 
the summer of 1988, directed me to report as Director of the Marine 
Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia. In the midst 
of his Corps-wide effort to enhance professional military education, 
he made clear his purpose from my first day of duty. He said simply, 
‘This school needs changing. My intent is for it to become the premier 
institution of its kind in the world. You cannot achieve that goal in the 
time I expect you to be here but you will have time to lay a foundation 
that allows it to happen.’ I received no more guidance, except a pointed 
edict to base all instruction on history and the concepts of manoeuver 
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warfare. General Gray wanted to separate classes on military history–
he insisted on weaving history into all the instructions on operations 
and tactics. The same admonition followed for ‘maneuverist thinking,’ 
with a strong suggestion that I ensure the infusion of Clausewitz and 
Sun Tzu into the course. Basically, he wanted the entire course to rest 
on military history and established ideas on strategy.”24 
Warfighting was born out of a desire to support professional education in 
the Marine Corps. According to Van Riper, “General Gray tasked the doc-
trine writers at Quantico to prepare a new ‘capstone’ manual that captured 
the essentials of warfare. Although many of my contemporaries–experienced 
colonels–hoped for assignment to the project, a young captain, John Smith, 
received the mission.”25 
The codification of a new way of doing things resulted in the Warfighting 
manual in 1989. The second edition states that the manual “has changed the 
way Marines think about warfare.”26 As was Al Gray’s style, Warfighting is 
not officially a publication by an individual. Although there is no official “au-
thorship” of Warfighting, Gray described in the foreword his key intentions 
for the document: “This book describes my philosophy on warfighting…You 
will notice that the book does not contain specific techniques and procedures 
for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and 
values. It requires judgment in application.”
Warfighting represented a change in how the Marine Corps conducted war-
fare. It was not a physical technology, but still a technological advance in how 
Marines performed operations. How did Gray implement Warfighting and 
what lessons can we draw from his experience? Leading and implementing 
manoeuver warfare as a way of thinking did not happen overnight. There 
were several elements Gray used to facilitate implementation:  experimenta-
tion and failure, debating concepts and ideas, reading and education, and 
boot camp and training. 
EXPERIMENTATION AND FAILURES 
Experimentation and learning from failure are classic ways that organiza-
tions learn new capabilities. In the Marine Corps context, Gray promoted 
several types of experimentation. He started efforts during the post-Vietnam 
turnaround of the Marine Corps, which had emerged from the conflict with 
several fundamental problems. 
First, Gray was comfortable with failure and recognized the need to make 
missteps to fine-tune the new operational paradigm. Initially, Gray sought 
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to learn from exercises and promoted debriefing as a means of learning. In 
terms of training, Gray established combined arms operations exercises at 
Fort Pickett. The first took place in the Fall of 1981 and involved field train-
ing plus a three-day war simulation involving the 6th Marine Amphibious 
Brigade which was also conducting a command post exercise. Gray led a 
control group with umpires and other observers from the manoeuver war-
fare board to report findings, and the editor of the Marine Corps Gazette 
was present to disseminate findings to the wider community. These early 
exercises demonstrated the validity of the manoeuver warfare concept at the 
practical level, and the concepts discussed in publications were important 
for promoting manoeuver warfare doctrine throughout the organization. 
Critical to the success of the experimentation was that these were not script-
ed scenarios where units were expected to play their part; by making the 
exercises free play, Gray could more accurately simulate combat scenarios 
and test the validity of the doctrine.
Gray emphasized learning from what happened. The exercises were not per-
fect, but emphasized learning from the processes rather than getting every-
thing right, and how junior officers could correct senior officers and needed 
to learn to trust their instincts and to speak up without fear. By breaking 
down hierarchy and emphasizing learning and ideas, Gray reinforced ma-
noeuver warfare and improved adaptive thinking among junior officers. 
WORDS MATTER:  DEBATING CONCEPTS AND IDEAS 
Years, even decades, before the publication of Warfighting, debates about “at-
trition” and “manoeuver” were present in the Marine Corps. It was manifest-
ed, for instance, in articles in the Marine Corps Gazette, involving discussions 
by like-minded colleagues who also shared an interest in building on John 
Boyd’s ideas to insert manoeuver warfare into the culture and the practice 
of the organization’s DNA. Publishing these ideas in the Marine Corp’s pro-
fessional journal was important to distribute the ideas and debates of the 
movement into the hearts and minds of young Marines. Gray drew from and 
promoted these writings as he promoted manoeuver warfare.
Several key articles during the 1970s and 1980s showcase the debates. In 
1979, Miller analyzed Soviet doctrine and argued that Marines could use 
concepts of manoeuver, exemplified through commanders like Alexander 
the Great, to win against superior odds.27 This article also described earlier 
intellectual foundations for manoeuver. William Lind’s article “Defining Ma-
noeuver Warfare” emphasized manoeuver as an evolutionary mindset (as op-
posed to “neoclassical” attritionism): 
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“Firepower-attrition is warfare on the model of Verdun in World War 
I, a mutual casualty inflicting and absorbing contest where the goal is 
a favorable exchange rate. The conflict is more physical than mental. 
Efforts focus on the tactical level with goals set in terms of terrain. 
Defenses tend to be linear (‘forward defense’), attacks frontal, battles 
set-piece and movement preplanned and slow. In contrast, manoeu-
ver warfare is warfare on the model of Genghis Khans, the German 
blitzkrieg and almost all Israeli campaigns. The goal is destruction 
of the enemy’s vital cohesion–disruption–not piece-by-piece physical 
destruction. The objective is the enemy’s mind not his body. The prin-
cipal tool is moving forces into unexpected places at surprisingly high 
speeds. Firepower is a servant of manoeuver, used to create openings 
in enemy defenses and, when necessary, to annihilate the remnants of 
his forces after the cohesion has been shattered.”28 
This reflects not just a different way of fighting, but a different way of thinking 
about fighting. 
In 1981, another piece by Wilson, Wyly, Lind, and Trainor focused on clari-
fying the intellectual roots of manoeuver warfare, but also identified some 
possible barriers to its implementation.29 In particular, the Marine Corp’s bu-
reaucratic inertia was identified as a key challenge, and the authors called for 
more initiative on the battlefield. The authors found manoeuver warfare to 
be one of the Marine Corps’ only hopes when faced with small numbers and 
changes in the global landscape. They called for a publication on manoeuver 
warfare–a manual.30
Some contributions also sought to build on ideas from both camps and 
sought a common foundation and clarification of misunderstandings.31 
These contributions used examples and lessons from experience to clarify 
ideas and urge further study of history. They emphasized that manoeuver 
warfare was not just about fighting, but also about a way of thinking that is 
adaptive to environmental change. 
In June 1984, Lind wrote about how to develop what was then called ma-
noeuver warfare doctrine, so that manoeuver warfare was not just words.32 
The concepts needed to be embedded and adopted in practices to make it 
part of the Marine Corps’ culture. Critically, he argued that the Marine Corps 
needed to build the concepts into Marine education, curricula and training, 
and he called for a reading program to broaden young Marines’ minds. Gray 
was at the time not just open to manoeuver warfare but had lived and prac-
ticed it too. He served as commanding general at Marine Forces Atlantic and 
in 1987 became just the right leader to work through the “suffocating muck 
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of bureaucracy.” In part, due to his efforts to promote a lively intellectual de-
bate around manoeuver warfare, manoeuver warfare moved from the edges 
of Marines to become a core organizing principle in less than a decade. With 
many of the intellectual pieces in place, the time was ripe for a paradigm shift 
and for the ideas to be built into the organization, including its practices, 
educational materials, and training. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF READING AND EDUCATION
Gray promoted not just intellectual debate, but intellectual development 
among Marine Corps personnel. Gray believed in professional development 
by extensively studying warfighting, and said, “The only way that I know that 
you can fully prepare yourself for battle, is to know what the hell you’re do-
ing. This requires study, this requires thinking, this requires talking to each 
other, this requires learning over a long period of time.”33 Gray was an unusu-
ally scholarly officer, and this is highlighted in the Warfighting manual: “A 
leader without either interest in or knowledge of the history and theory–the 
intellectual content of his profession–is a leader in appearance only.”34 
As such, Gray established the Commandant’s Reading List in 1988. The read-
ing list is comprised of a common list of books and other publications for all 
Marines, with additional readings depending on an individual Marine’s rank. 
These readings are intended to help Marines learn about the institution of the 
Marine Corps, the profession of warfighting, and lessons about leadership 
and history pertinent to the Marine Corps and its operations. 
Gray’s dedication to reading is famous: “When he was at Camp Lejeune he 
amassed an enormous library of films, books and monographs on the tech-
niques of war that was open to all his officers. He has encouraged the exami-
nation of such techniques as manoeuver warfare, which reduces the reliance 
on fire power and technology.”35 The current Secretary of Defense has recent-
ly emphasized the role of the Marine Corps reading lists.36  Gray’s emphasis 
on reading represented a shift from traditional military culture. 
“The American military, along with many European militaries, evi-
denced a disdain for overt intellectual activities by its officers for 
much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To most officers, 
such interests fell short in reflecting the manliness expected of those 
in uniform. Hard fighting, hard riding, and hard drinking elicited far 
more appreciation from an officer’s peers than the perusal of books…
Seeds of this anti-intellectualism remain, despite the efforts of several 
generations of reformers dedicated to improving professional military 
education.”37 
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BOOT CAMP AND TRAINING
“Much more than the other branches, they place pride and respon-
sibility at the lowest levels of the organization…‘Every Marine is a 
rifleman’ states one key Corps motto. It means the essence of the or-
ganization resides with the lowest of the low”38 
Boot camp makes each Marine into a reproduction of every other marine. 
They do not have individual styles and are discouraged from acting as in-
dividuals and even discouraged to think of themselves as individuals. They 
dress alike. They move alike. They talk alike. They think alike. They learn 
to eat like a Marine, sleep like a Marine, and breathe like a Marine. Marine 
Corps basic training is a place where Marines are indoctrinated with the val-
ues of the Marine Corps and identification to the organization. Boot camp is 
specifically designed to inculcate loyalty.
In other words, the Marines cultivate and build a kind of organizational loy-
alty and identification that encourages a “learned selflessness” and concern 
beyond one-self. Their leaders live and teach by example to put others and 
their organization ahead of themselves. This is very different than standard 
notions of self-interest, hero-individual-leaders, and opportunism in the 
management and organizations literature. It is boot camp (or basic for of-
ficers) where Marines get their first full-on contact with the Corps’ culture. 
In his book about boot camp, Tom Ricks observes that 
“The Marines are distinct even within the separate world of the US 
military. Theirs is a culture apart. The Air Force has its planes, the 
Navy its ships, the Army its obsessively written and obeyed ‘doctrine’ 
that dictates how to act. Culture–that is, the values and assumptions 
that shape its members–is all the Marines have. It is what holds them 
together…Theirs is the richest culture:  formalistic, insular, elitist, 
with a deep anchor in their own history and mythology.”39 
SUMMING UP:  LEADERSHIP AS DISRUPTION
Manoeuver warfare and the Warfighting manual was a disruptive in-
novation in the Marine Corps, but in order for it to have sustaining 
effects, it had to be embodied in the soul and DNA of the organiza-
tion. For manoeuver warfare to take its place as the Marine Corps’ 
organizing principle, several organizational factors needed to be in 
place. Central to manoeuver warfare’s success was the role of Gray in 
pushing forward learning and experimentation, intellectual debate, 
reading, and building loyalty in boot camp. These factors combined to 
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push manoeuver warfare from a periphery theory to a central Marine 
Corps doctrine. In the next section, we explore some more general 
organizational lessons from the manoeuver warfare example.
SOME ORGANIZATIONAL AND  
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS:   
THE NATURE OF THE PROCESS OF DISRUPTIVE 
CHANGE AND HOW TO MANAGE IT
“We must guard against overreliance on technology. Technology can 
enhance the ways and means of war by improving man’s ability wage it, 
but technology cannot and should not attempt to eliminate man from 
the process…Better equipment is not the cure for all ills… Any ad-
vantages gained by technological advancements are only temporary.”40 
“Since we have concluded that war is a human enterprise and no 
amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our phi-
losophy...must be based on human characteristics rather than on the 
equipment of procedures…Our philosophy must not only accommo-
date but must exploit human traits such as boldness, initiative, per-
sonality, strength of will, and imagination.”41 
LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
1.   Learning from forgotten failures and pursuing organizational and strategic 
transformation through “evolution with design”  
One of the paradoxes of organizations is that the more they build capabilities 
to do one thing, the less inclined they are to do others. Management schol-
ars have pointed to the importance of ambidextrous organizations:  those 
that can manage and balance both exploration and exploitation. Embracing 
a metaphor of organizational management as one of evolution with design 
emphasizes the continuing strategic transformation and renewal of organiza-
tional capabilities as well as using and refining existing ones. 
Managers can help create a better environment for this through strategic de-
sign of organizational and psychological architectures to facilitate learning, 
including learning from failures and hypothetical histories. Also central is an 
environment where ideas matter at least as much as rank; new ideas often do 
not come from the top of the organization, and if organizational members 
do not feel free to speak up, then ideas will never reach the top. Google and 
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others are famous for having structures for experimental thinking. RAND 
Corporation, many years before, had carefully thought of this as well. It is 
essential to have an environment that encourages creative thinking. A former 
commandant of the Marine Corps University noted that he wanted a place 
where “freedom of thought was not only encouraged by rewarded. The idea 
is that the experimentation should be taken to the failure point…that only by 
reaching that point would we understand the unknowns.”42
Change takes time and much trial and error learning. The forgotten failures 
are essential parts of the process of disruption too, and they need to be cul-
tivated. After-action reviews and other methods to capture essential lessons 
from failures could help to promote a learning culture within an organiza-
tion. Also, emphasizing the incremental nature of change is beneficial; even 
seemingly revolutionary change is often evolutionary and more incremental 
in nature.
2.  Inertia
Inertia is often a great barrier to disruption, good or bad. Organizational 
leaders and designers can attempt to avoid the negative effects of disruption 
by building disruption into the design and structure of the organization. 
Gray built disruption by promoting intellectual debate and thinking among 
regular Marine Corps personnel, such that they saw the value of manoeuver 
warfare doctrine and were willing to break out of inertia. Such organizations 
have a greater chance of achieving momentum. 
3.  Value of “innovation in the small” and slow innovations
“Innovation in the small,” or more incremental innovations, can have a pro-
found disruptive impact, but it may be a different kind of disruption than 
often emphasized. Disruptions need to be assessed based on their effect on 
the organization’s goals, not on their perceived importance. 
While popular treatments of disruption focus on instant success stories, in-
novations often take a very long time to develop and implement. For exam-
ple, carrier innovation began at the end of World War I but did not become a 
core capability until World War II. 
4.  The evolutionary and organizational nature of disruptive changes
Disruptive change is not just about technology, or just processes, but works 
when unlocking mechanisms that are organizational and behavioural as well. 
The capabilities for managing these are central for creating and maintaining 
competitive advantages. With disruptive innovation, it is tempting to study 
the technologies at work, but disruption is domain for the intersection of 
technology, human nature, organizations and society. As such, focusing on 
 TECHNOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES | 145 
CHAPTER 7
the organizational processes that lead a disruptive innovation into adoption 
is valuable for understanding how disruption affects organizations. 
5.  Embracing uncertainty, not repressing it
“In the ‘fog of war’ there is chaos, and in that chaos opportunities 
present themselves.”43 
Disruption and innovation is at the heart of uncertainty. Behavioural theory 
and capabilities-based strategy embraces uncertainty and ambiguity, rather 
than trying to repress it. The competition organizations face involves uncer-
tainty, but if embraced rather than assumed away, one can also help shape 
the competition going forward. This requires understanding the psycholo-
gies of competitors, as well as trying to create and utilize asymmetries in the 
competition to create and sustain competitive advantages. At the heart of this 
is a behavioural conception of decision-making with individuals limited in 
their rationalities and computational powers.44 One basis of management in 
organizations is the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in all decision mak-
ing. Addressing such ambiguity requires developing behaviours to facilitate 
shared perceptions and beliefs, starting with the leader’s vision and an un-
derstanding of the nature of the organization and its strategic environment. 
CONCLUSION
“Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems 
nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is sup-
posed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can 
give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of the re-
lationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action.”45 
The successful implementation of any disruptive innovation depends on 
thinking hard about changes to the external environment and by perform-
ing “behavioural competitor analysis.” The RMA thinking referenced ear-
lier (a widely acknowledged disruptive change) began by studying how the 
Soviets were studying changes in warfare; the USMC manoeuver warfare also 
came about by understanding the long-term strategic environment in differ-
ent ways.  Such examples point out the importance of experimentation and 
embracing disruptive thinking that may not work; emphasizing the manage-
ment processes underlying disruption; and understanding how competitors 
work and think as a key driver of one’s own organizational strategy.
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